Russia is now in the final negotiation phase regarding its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Discussions have been held over the past fourteen years and have contributed indisputably to the transformation of the Russian economy and the modernization of its legislature. If there are still unanswered questions at the start of 2007, the unbalanced nature of the negotiations runs the risk of Russia having to make further concessions to its partners in order to speed up the agreement's conclusion. In the longer term, the main challenge faced by Russian authorities is to ensure that documents that are already in force are transposed.

In 1996, the Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe both in spite of and owing to its democratic failings. Accession was, in fact, seen as a step toward democratic conversion. Ten years an, as the Council is presided by Russia for the first time, an initial appraisal can be made using the following questions as guideline: to what extend has the Council of Europe influenced Russia, and to what extend has Russia - taking into account observed regressions - modified the current nature of the Council?

The relationships between the EU, NATO and Russia are of great significance for all their actors and for regional security more broadly. The overlapping remit of each is complementary, and provides a potentially beneficial way to address current military and soft security concerns. And indeed good progress has been made —formal relationships have been established and there has been some practical cooperation in a number of areas. This progress is particularly impressive when considered in appropriate historical context— i.e. against the backdrop of East-West confrontation. Few would have foreseen such progress fifteen or even ten years ago. However, there is no 'triangle' —ambiguity and contradiction mar all the relationships, which are dogged by a number of conflicting interests. Moreover, although the top leadership of all three entities profess the desire to enhance the relationships, it is clear that a number of constituencies on all sides do not seek similar developments, for a number of reasons. This has slowed cooperation significantly. EU-NATO cooperation therefore remains problematic, and the West's relations with Russia are by no means past some 'point of no return', to the confrontation of the past half century.

Energy security and gas supply have become issues of central concern for the European Union as reserves in the North Sea are dwindling. Russia is offering to replace the North Sea supplies in the future, but the EU should be aware that Moscow will not be able to fully meet Europe's demand in the future. Russia will remain a significant supplier, but the EU needs to look for other possible sources of gas supply in Northern Africa, in the Caspian Sea region, in the Barents Sea, and in the Persian Gulf. Diversification is the best strategy for enhancing European energy security.

In collaboration with its partners, Ifri is currently supporting a Task Force on the future of EU-Russia relations. The first workshop was held on 2 December 2005 in Paris.

Over the past six years, a subdivided though very centralised mecanism for Russian-German cooperation has been forming. This mecanism has enabled many issues within bilateral relations to be resolved, but at the same time contributed to growing alienation between officiel attitudes and the mood in civil society in both countries. The 'Schröder-Poutin era' in Russian-German relations is coming to end, and it stands to reason that the new government will make changes. However, these are likely to affect the style, and not the substance of relations with Russia.

Double issue in partnership with the CERFA

Hannes Adomeit, 'Germany's Policy on Russia: End of the Honeymoon?' (original title in German: 'Deutsche Russlandpolitik: Ende des 'Schmusekurses'?'), Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 6(b), September 2005

Moscow's relationships with both Brussels and London have been bumpy. Nonetheless, recent progress in EU-Russie relations suggests the potential for refashioning the 'strategic partnership' in a more realistic manner. The UK's priorities are to build on the successes of the Luxembourg presidency and convert plans into practical projects. There are a number of difficulties however, including continuing differences in values and potential clashes of interests. These are likely to be exacerbated by problems in the policy-making structures on both sides. Although the chance exists to add momentum to the relationship, progress will be slow and small scale.