Chad: from Deby to Deby. Recipes for a successful succession (2021-2024)
As in Togo and Gabon, the transition that took place in Chad from 2021 to
2024 resulted in a dynastic succession. Mahamat Idriss Deby succeeded his
father, Idriss Deby Itno, who was President of Chad from 1996 to 2021. While
the majority of Chadians were hoping for a change of government, the “Deby
system” has managed to hold on.
This study deciphers the strategy of this transition-succession, which
consisted in :
- believing in the possibility of change without alternation, by insisting on
the age of the new president and initiating new political orientations; - consolidate the traditional pillars of power;
- forcibly intimidate the opposition and take advantage of its divisions;
- institutionally confiscate the organization of the constitutional
referendum and elections, as well as the drafting of the founding texts of
the new Republic.
This strategy was all the more effective given that, in the geopolitical
context of the new Cold War, there is no longer any international player (even
at continental and regional level) capable of imposing itself as the arbiter or
guarantor of political transitions. This new geopolitical situation has given
the Chadian government almost total freedom to implement its succession
plan and impose itself through elections with implausible results.
If the transition from 1993 to 1996 marked the transition from Hissene
Habre’s regime to Idriss Deby’s, the transition of 2021-2024 marked the
succession from Deby to Deby.
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Chad: from Deby to Deby. Recipes for a successful succession (2021-2024)
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