Since the inception of the multilateral trading system, optimally articulating international trade liberalization commitments with developing countries’ national economic strategies has been a central debate. The launch of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001 installed, in theory, the trade and development nexus at the very heart of the WTO negotiations. The principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) asserts the need to adapt international trade rules to the specific economic situation of DCs.

However, forty years after being developed, the main concepts underlying the traditional approach of SDT in the WTO seem largely exhausted. Based on the notions of “preference” and “non-reciprocity” of trade commitments, the SDT embodies a systemic contradiction within a world trading system built upon the basic principles of “non-discrimination” and “reciprocal commitments”. The stalemate of SDT and market negotiations over the issues of DC differentiation and preference erosion suggest that the system may have reached the bottom of the contradiction, contributing to hold back the prospects of a successful “development round”.

Against this backdrop, this volume addresses two key issues in the development dimension of the DDA, and aims at identifying avenues for a way forward in the WTO negotiations. The first issue is the future of non-reciprocal preferences: what kind of trade and development strategies and insurance against adjustment shocks can be proposed to the countries –in particular members of the G90– facing the threat of preference erosion? The second issue relates to DC differentiation: is it possible to craft a newburden-sharing of global trade responsibilities between developed and emerging economies, in particular G20 leaders?