Americans have always been ambivalent towards European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and they remain so even after the Alliance's most recent reforms. In theory, officials and analysts in the United States have tended to express wholehearted support for the creation and strengthening of an European pillar, and since 1995, they have professed great satisfaction at the prospect of this identity being built within, as opposed to independent from, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In practice, however, most Americans have never been so enthusiastic. Most US analysts are skeptical about Europe's prospects for genuinely building up a serious military capability, and US officials are rarely willing to make the types of compromises that might be necessary to make the Alliance more balanced. The US Congress is not only ambivalent, but often contradictory: many legislators demand that Europeans do more and take more responsibility (for example in Bosnia), but many (sometimes the same ones) also strongly resist any European attempts to implement policies other than those desired by the United States.

As a result of these American attitudes, there are significant misunderstandings about ESDI on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas Europeans -and especially the French- have tended to interpret the ESDI as a genuine opportunity to enhance Europe's capacity to influence NATO and, if necessary, to act without it, Americans tend to take it less seriously. Europe's attempts to strengthen its military capability and organization are all well and good, and Americans do not object to the creation of a theoretical capacity within the Alliance for autonomous European operations. But many Americans are also often doubtful that an effective military capability will actually be created given falling European defense budgets, and they are skeptical that Europe's theoretical capacity for action within NATO will ever be used. Indeed, Americans seem to interpret the purpose of ESDI literally -it is about the creation of an 'identity' (not a 'capability'), meant more to give the Europeans a feeling of unity and responsibility than the actual ability to act.

Europeans often resent what they see as a condescending American attitude -even American arrogance- and demand that the United States take more seriously, and give more substance to, Europe's role within NATO. They justifiably dislike being asked to pay more and do more without gaining commensurate influence on NATO's decisionmaking. But if the ESDI is to be given substance in the coming years and if Europe's role in the Alliance is to grow, the burden for accomplishing this will fall to the Europeans, not the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the overwhelming NATO priority for Washington now and for the next several years is enlargement, and ESDI, among American priorities, takes a clear back seat. Americans would welcome -as they always have- more European defense spending and a greater European contribution to common goals, but they are unlikely to be forthcoming about sharing responsibility in an Alliance where the United States appears to have more power and leverage than ever.

Although Europeans often (rightly) complain about the lack of US support for (and sometimes even the resistance to) ESDI, the main responsibility for its current weakness lies with Europe itself. If Europeans could muster the unity and military power that a true ESDI would imply, the responsibility and influence within the Alliance would follow whether the Americans liked it or not. As it happens, however, few Europeans seem to believe that a true ESDI is worth the effort, the European Union (EU) has proven unable to agree on the institutional adjustments that common positions would require, and most Europeans seem willing to live with the status quo of an Alliance dominated by the United States. Although there would be some advantages to a more effective ESDI within the Alliance, the most likely prospects are that Europe's hopes for greater roles and responsibilities within NATO remain unfulfilled.