Renewables in Transport: Directive 2009/28/EC - Devils in its Details
This Actuelle precedes a longer and more exhaustive paper on Electric Vehicles, under the title "The Electric Vehicle in the Climate Change Race: Tortoise, Hare or both?" by Maïté de Boncourt.
As part of the 3*20 targets reached in December 2008, the EC decided that the EU should, by 2020, source 20% of its Final Energy Consumption (FEC) renewably.
Working towards this aim should in general contribute to the primary objective of reducing emissions, but there are two major issues with the implementation of the target in the Transport sector which run the risk of being irrelevant or even counterproductive. Firstly, the constraining stipulation that all Member States should source 10% of their Transport sector FEC renewably will be a struggle for some Member States to achieve, forcing them to invest large amounts of money which would be better spent elsewhere. Secondly, the relevant legislation gives unrepresentative weight to the benefits of Electric Vehicles (EVs), meaning that Member States which invest in EVs may give the illusion of having reached their national renewable targets without actually having done so.
This paper is based on EC Directive 2009/28/EC (henceforth referred to as ‘the Directive") and the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK which were submitted in response. Each EU Member State has an individual target for the proportion of its FEC which is to come from renewable sources in 2020. The targets are based on the countries" existing renewable shares (as shown in Table 1 below) and their supposed capacity for improvement. Together, they give an average EU-wide target of 20% across the 27 Member States.
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Renewables in Transport: Directive 2009/28/EC - Devils in its Details
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