From nonproliferation to strategic competition: US export controls and China

Technological competition is at the heart of the renewed great-power competition that has characterized relations between the USA and China since the 2010s. The role of technological innovation in the evolution of power relations is already recognized in the literature of international relations. However, developments in US technology policy under the last two administrations raise the reverse question: how does the perception of changing power relations (in this case, Chinese technological catch-up perceived as a threat to US leadership) transform policies granting or denying access to technological innovation?

This study sheds light on the transformation in the American conception of export controls: mainly conceived in the post-Cold War era as a law enforcement and nonproliferation tool, it has become a strategic instrument to restrict technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China. Using a Foreign Policy Analysis approach based on the analysis of legal texts, speeches, and interviews with the political actors involved, this article examines the policy process, leading to this fundamental change in US export control policy. As this study demonstrates, this change reflects a new interpretation of the link between economic and security interests, as well as the expansion of the perimeter of American national security.
This article was published in International Politics.
Visit Springer Nature's website to access Mathilde Velliet's article, which is only available in English.
Mathilde Velliet is a research fellow at Ifri's Center for Geopolitics of Technology.
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