In Europe, with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showing little sign of abating, a persistent gap remains between security needs and defense spending. According to a 2006 commitment enshrined at the 2014 Wales NATO summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should disburse no less than 2% of their national gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, out of which 20% is to be spent on equipment and research and development. In 2024, only 23 Allies out of 32 are expected to meet or exceed this target, though a significant improvement from only three in 2014. This total includes the United States (US) devoting 3.38% of its GDP to defense, constituting almost 70% of all NATO member defense spending combined. 

While major European powers may have to contemplate nuclear deterrence without America, the national flexibility and European financial support required to make it feasible is currently difficult to imagine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has flung Europe’s Eastern flank into a new phase of strategic confrontation. It has had a major effect on France’s position, which was previously somewhat timid, leading it to significantly reinforce its deterrence and defense posture in support of the collective defense of Europe, in the name of strategic solidarity and the protection of its security interests.

Recent conflicts have highlighted a key characteristic of contemporary warfare, unprecedented in its scale and impact on the conduct of operations: “battlefield transparency”. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a turning point in German defense policy. After thirty years of military downsizing, the Bundeswehr found itself at an extremely low capability level just as a high-intensity war involving a great power was breaking out on Europe’s doorstep for the first time since 1945. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s response was to embrace this “turning point” (Zeitenwende) by launching a major program to reequip Germany’s armed forces.

With a rapidly deteriorating security environment, a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, internal disputes exploding into public view, and questions being raised about the scope of its security responsibilities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seemed to be in dire straits at the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking.

Although it is one of the smallest states on the African continent, Rwanda has adopted a proactive foreign policy. Kigali has deployed troops within the framework of multilateral peacekeeping missions to increase its prestige and influence. Since last year, changes have arisen: Rwanda has extended its activities outside of multilateral operations, intervening unilaterally in the Central African Republic (CAR) and then in Mozambique. Rwanda desires to foster its reputation as a regional and continental “security provider”. 

What will the economic order in the Indo-Pacific region look like twenty years from now? What are the major trends shaping it, and how are they likely to evolve in the near future?

Operational command structures have always been able to adapt to the strategic context. However, they now face a new challenge: high intensity threats.