Hypersonic systems are becoming attributes of power for the states that design and implement them, at the risk of reviving an arms race.

Ever since nuclear weapons were developed by the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Europe has lived under the nuclear shadow. A major direct confrontation between “the West” and “the East” could have very likely resulted in the detonation of nuclear weapons on the continent. As the Cold War ended, massive reductions in the US and Soviet arsenals (from 70,300 in 1986 to 13,890 in 2019) and a new security architecture radically transformed the European security environment.

Russia has recently accused the United States and NATO Allies of violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by arguing that NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements are not permitted under the Treaty.

Traditionally, maneuver units are designed for mobility and control of the ground, while supporting forces (artillery, aviation) deliver fires to protect the former and ensure their freedom of action.

Strong states often fail to deter vastly weaker competitors. This paper explores some reasons of this failure and identifies factors that can increase the prospects that deterrence will succeed in these situations.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the threat of cruise missile proliferation is as equally challenging to NATO as the threat of ballistic missiles. Over the last two decades, the emergence of cruise missiles and UAVs as a threat has been slow, and governments, particularly the United States, have invested much less in cruise missile defenses than in ballistic missile defenses.

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing them back to their counterinsurgency roots.